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1. Introduction 
 
Ever since the introduction of endogenous growth theory and the increasing returns 
hypothesis, in the notable Romer (1986) article, theoretical growth economics has debated on 
the sources of increasing returns and the policy implications of endogenous growth. Earlier 
contributions by Lucas (1990), Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), 
Saint-Paul (1992) and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), suggested that government spending 
and taxing policies should have an important role on long run growth outcomes. We follow 
closely this set of proposals and develop a multiple instruments fiscal policy model, based on 
the Turnovsky (1999) proposal, of an open economy model with an elastic labour supply, where 
increasing returns arise from productive public spending, to discuss the implications of 
informality in the outcomes of long run growth and government fiscal policy. 
 
Other recent extensions on the subject of government policy and endogenous growth, which 
follow similar modelling assumptions as ours, include fiscal policy models, where government 
spending is used, not only to provide public services, but also to invest in human capital 
formation, such as Ortigueira (1998) and Agénor (2005). Park and Philippopoulos (2003) 
discuss optimal fiscal policy and dynamic determinacy in a continuous deterministic 
endogenous growth model with increasing returns, generated by public infrastructure and 
additional non productive public spending, specifically public consumption services and 
redistributive transfers. Still, there is a large scope for discussing policy implications in 
endogenous growth theory. Our proposal serves this purpose by extending fiscal policy 
implications when tradeoffs arise from informality, in both capital and labour markets. 
 
The work of Jones and Manuelli (1990) on convex models of endogenous growth provided a 
framework for introducing long transitions in endogenous growth models. Their proposal 
consisted in assuming that production was given separately, by two economic sectors with 
different production technologies, during transitions to the long run. One of the sectors 
produced macro outcomes with increasing returns, while the other followed neoclassical 
assumptions. The dynamic outcome of the original hypothesis consisted on a long run growth 
equilibrium determined by the increasing returns sector and saddle path transitions 
influenced by the neoclassical sector dynamical decay. Despite providing a simple framework 
for tackling both, two sector models of endogenous growth and introducing transitional 
dynamics, this proposal was somehow undermined by the long, rigid transitions arising both 
from convergence and comparative dynamic analysis. Industrial change and structural 
adjustment was not as persistent and long as this proposal suggested and, therefore, the Jones 
and Manuelli (1990) framework was dismissed as a reasonable approach to tackle these 
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issues. Still, the potential to tackle persistent low tech industrial phenomena, subject to long 
adjustment periods was there and matched the observed outcomes of informality in developed 
countries. In Mendonça (2007) 3, we propose that the formal vs. informal outcomes for growth 
in a developed open economy may be portrayed in the Jones and Manuelli (1990) fashion. This 
hypothesis departs from some specific micro and macro assumptions. First, opportunities arise 
for entrepreneurial informal activities at the micro level, due to government lack of regulation 
and fiscalization, which can be shown to be consistent with long transitions at the macro level. 
Second, if we consider the informal sector of the economy to be accountable for long transitions 
towards long run growth optimal equilibrium, then matching continuous persistence of low 
tech informal activities can be shown to arise when innovations are considered during 
transitions. In this framework, informal activities would persist in a sub-optimal continuous 
adjustment process, where long run outcomes are not be given by a stable steady-state 
equilibrium, but are a sum of short to medium run periods of transitions. 
 
2. Overview 
 
Why is informality both important for growth and policy even in developed countries? 
Although, this is a current and important topic of development economics research, it has not 
been considered as a relevant topic in growth theory. This paradigm is based on a stylized fact, 
which considers that only the large dominant informal sectors of developing countries can be 
accounted to have both growth and policy implications. Where, in industrialized economies the 
relevance of this activity is limited and thus negligible. This stylized assumption may have 
been true for some advanced economies during the post war period, but is certainly not true 
nowadays. We start defying this assumption by reproducing bellow a table that briefly 
summarizes informal activities into straightforward categories: 
 
Type of Activity Monetary Transactions Nonmonetary Transactions 
ILLEGAL 
ACTIVITIES 
Trade in stolen goods; drug dealing and 
manufacturing; prostitution; gambling; 
smuggling, and fraud 
Barter: drugs, stolen goods, smuggling etc. 
Produce or growing drugs for own use. Theft 
for own use. 
 Tax Evasion Tax Avoidance Tax Evasion Tax Avoidance 
LEGAL 
ACTIVITIES 
Unreported income 
from self-employment; 
Wages, salaries and 
assets from 
unreported work 
related to legal 
services and goods 
Employee 
discounts, fringe 
benefits 
Barter of legal 
services and goods 
All do-it-yourself work 
and neighbour help 
Table 1- Taxonomy of Types of Underground Economic Activities4 
                                                
3 The basic framework for this model was first introduced in one of the chapters from master 
dissertation at ISEG/UTL. This paper extends both the analytical and numerical proposals for the 
specific case without investment adjustment costs. 
4Reproduced from Schneider and Enste (2000). 
3 
 
 
From all definitions portrayed in table 1, there exists one important characteristic, which is 
common between all these specific classifications for informality. Each one of us, residents of 
industrialized countries, has already been, at least, partially exposed to these shadow 
activities and was given descriptions of these schemes, through third party information, 
ranging from informal talks to mass media coverage of this phenomenon. The straightforward 
conclusion for this widespread individual exposition to information on these activities is that 
they are relevant, persistent and widespread in social economic systems. The differences in 
both economic scale and diversity of these categories are also evidence that opportunities for 
profiteering from informality are diverse and not restricted to specific social and economic 
conditions. They are in fact an emergent macro outcome of social economic systems, arising 
from agent’s behaviour and microeconomic market conditions. One straightforward conclusion 
to be drawn is that underground activities, which exhibit characteristics such as persistency, 
scale and diversity, must have both implications for growth and policy, even in developed 
economies.  
 
The second hypothesis supporting the stylized assumptions about the implications of 
informality in industrialized nations, consists on the perceived correlation between informal 
business scale and economic relevance. The paradigm suggests that if the informal sector is 
small, then its impact must also be small, even if it persists in the long run. Research on the 
size and causes of informality contradicts this view for industrialized economies and provides 
evidence that this phenomenon is not only persistent in developed economies, but has also 
increased in dimension, during the past two decades, when compared to the relative formal 
sector dimension on total output share. Schneider (2005) reports an average size for the 
informal sector relative to GDP of 13,2% in 21 OECD economies, for the years 1989/90, using 
the currency demand and DYMIMIC method5. These values increase to an average size of 
16,4% for the years 2002/03, representing an increase on total output share of about 24% for 
informal activities, during this recent thirteen years time frame, which represents an average 
annual growth of about 1,6% for the output share of informal activities. If we extend our time 
frame some decades to the past, using Frey and Schneider (2001) results, we can emphasize 
the increasing role of informality in developed economies. They report that Nordic economies, 
except for Finland, had an average informal sector size of less than 5% relative to GNP in 
1960, according to the currency demand method. This output share increases to values of 
about 15% to 20%, when we consider the year 1995. The growth of output share for informal 
activities in industrialized economies varies according to the countries we consider, but we can 
                                                
5Dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes method. Refer to Schneider (2005) for further details in 
this recent modelling technique. 
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state, with some degree of confidence, that an increasing share of output has been located in 
the informal sectors of industrialized economies during the past two decades. Moreover, we 
can also state that this specific sector is no longer residual and in some cases, as in south 
European countries, it represents between one fifth to almost one third of total output share.  
 
What are the causes for this clear trend in developed economies and what are the 
consequences of this increasing output share for policy outcomes? There are two key causes 
that may explain this evidence and at the same time are able to capture this trend, even if we 
consider the specific socio-cultural and political backgrounds of different developed economies. 
These causes are increasing government spending and bureaucracy, in industrialized 
countries, during the past four decades. Both these causes are widely accepted for explaining 
this trend, because they match basic industrial economics theory. Increasing bureaucracy and 
taxes augment both fixed and marginal costs, distort market prices, consequently, creating 
legal and economic barriers to entry in the formal sector, decreasing present and future profits 
for formal sector firms and widening the range of opportunities for illegal activities. We try to 
tackle these two issues in an endogenous framework for a small developed economy, where 
informal activities arise during transitions, taking advantage of these arbitrage conditions at 
the micro level. Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2004) explore these same sources of opportunities 
for informal activities in a developing economy, considering a CES production function and 
increasing returns arising from the usual aggregate capital hypothesis. Although, our 
framework has many similarities with the hypotheses proposed in Peñalosa and Turnovsky 
(2004), the main scope of their article are the second optimal policies that arise in the presence 
of a government that lacks revenues and only has access to a limited formal sector for 
taxation. Other examples of articles that follow similar hypotheses for developing economies in 
an endogenous growth framework are Braun and Loayza (1994) and Sarte (1999), which 
tackle the issue of rent-seeking bureaucracies acting through excessive regulation and 
taxation. Amaral and Quentin (2006) tackle informality in a neoclassical competitive growth 
framework, where informal managers exchange physical capital for low-skilled labour, in 
order to cope with limited access to outside investment and financing. The consequences of a 
growing informal sector are thus evident for both macroeconomic and microeconomic 
government policy and embody a loss of effectiveness by public authorities to enforce their 
policies, when facing competition from a sector that acts as a substitute to government 
regulation, in order to be competitive in a market framework. 
 
We finish this section by reviewing the modelling background that we will consider for our 
endogenous growth model. We have already discussed that we consider a small open economy 
model with elastic labour supply and a government sector, following Turnovsky (1999). For a 
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background on the Turnovsky (1999) modelling proposal of endogenous growth in small open 
economy fiscal policy model, refer to Turnovsky (1996a, 1996b). For a detailed overview on the 
specific dynamics arising in endogenous growth models of open economies, following this basic 
framework, refer to Turnovsky (2002). For a complete overview and additional proposals on 
this class of models, considering both an elastic labour supply and adjustment costs, refer to 
Mendonça (2007). 
 
3. The Model6 
 
This economy will consist of N  identical households and firms. Aggregate conditions are 
given by equation (A1) and households can allocate their time between labour, ( , and 
leisure, l , which are set  endogenously by model dynamics. 
)1 l−
 
1
 ,    ,  1,2
n
i i i
i
X x N X X i
=
= = =∑  (A1) 
The representative agent’s welfare is given by the following intertemporal isoelastic utility 
function, as in Turnovsky (1999). Equations (A2) and (A3) define the individual’s utility and 
the aggregate utility for this economy, respectively: 
 ( )
0
1 tU cl e
γθ ρ
γ
∞ −= ∫ dt  (A2) 
 ( )
0
1
/ tU C N l e
γθ ρ
γ
∞ −⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ dt
γθ
                                                
 (A3) 
( )0 ;  - 1 ;  1 1  ;  1θ γ γ θ> ∞ < < > + >  
As usual C  stands for aggregate private consumption, c  is the household consumption, and 
parameters and , are related with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the 
impact of leisure on the utility of the representative agent, respectively. The constraints 
imposed on the parameters are necessary to ensure that the utility function is concave in c  
and l . 
γ θ
 
In this economy positive externalities are the result of public productive capital. Output for 
the individual formal firm is determined by a Samuelson type production function with non-
excludable and non-rival public goods. Our proposal follows closely the well known hypotheses 
defined in Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992). The formulation followed here is 
a variation to assume an elastic labour supply, as described in Turnovsky (1999): 
6For reasons of simplification, we discard the use of the time subscript in the time varying variables of 
our model. The meaningful variables are consumption, investment, domestic capital accumulation and 
foreign debt accumulation. Leisure, labour allocation and government spending are given endogenously 
and are also subject to transitions. 
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 ( ) 11 1 1y AG l kβ φ −⎡ ⎤= − 1 β⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦A  (A4) 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1/ 1y A G k l kβ φ 1⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦A  (A5) 
 
1
           0 1G gY g= < <  (A6) 
 ( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1 1
1Y K A gN l K
φβ β β− −⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎟⎜= −⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ A 1
β
)1
 (A7) 
0 1,  0 1,  ,  0 1β φ φ β α< < < < < < <  
Output for the individual formal firm, , is given by the usual neoclassical Cobb-Douglas 
production function, (A4). The endogenous variable  defines the percentage of time devoted 
to working in the formal sector by our representative agent. This endogenous variable is 
included to ensure the normalization of the labour input to one is maintained and because it 
gives a straightforward option for taking an optimal control rule for labour allocation between 
sectors. As it is our intention to maintain the labour input normalized to one,  will vary 
between zero and one, and labour allocation in the informal sector will be just 1 . As usual 
in economic growth formalizations,  denotes the individual firm capital stock and  the 
aggregate capital stock. G represents aggregate public spending and g  the share the 
government share of formal output. Parameters A , , and φ  stand for the formal exogenous 
technology and the elasticities of government spending and labour, respectively. 
1
y
1
A
β
1
A
1
A−
i
k
i
K
 
In order to obtain an AK technology in the aggregate framework it is convenient to tie 
government expenditure, G , to aggregate formal output, , where g  acts as an endogenously 
determined fraction of government expenditure relative to aggregate output. Applying 
aggregate conditions to the representative firm production, (A4), we obtain the aggregate 
formal output for this economy, as expressed in (A7). Parameter restrictions are given above 
and a restriction to guarantee that labour productivity is diminishing in the aggregate, 
, is additionally considered. 
1
Y
1φ < −
 
The government sector of this economy can only observe and tax activities that occur in the 
formal sector. We consider, for reasons of simplification, that the public sector must always 
manage a balanced budget with no possibility of issuing public debt bonds. As public spending 
has been tied up to aggregate output, it follows that the balanced government budget 
constraint is given by: 
  (A8) (
11 1 1 1
(1 )
c w k k
C w l N r K T gY Kτ τ τ+ − + + =A
7 
 
Where, , represent taxes on wage income for formal sector labour allocation, , capital 
income taxes on revenues from entrepreneurial formal activities, , consumption taxes and 
finally a lump sum tax given by 
w
τ
k
τ
c
τ
T Nτ = . Taxes on foreign bonds, , are a possibility 
considered in Turnovsky (1999) that we relax in our framework. This excludes the possibility 
of subsidies on foreign debt accumulation, without imposing an additional parameter 
restriction, and has no relevant implications on the dynamic behaviour of this economy. 
b
τ
 
The representative firm in the informal sector will also have its output given by a Cobb-
Douglas production function, following the same structure of (A4), where all productive factor 
intensities, including the elasticity of the government input, are lower than the ones 
considered for the formal sector production function. These hypotheses are necessary in order 
to obtain static equilibrium conditions for capital and labour decisions between sectors. They 
are also reasonable if we consider that informality arises, in order to take advantage of the 
absence of government regulation and taxation. Therefore, in spite of using a worst 
technology, they are still able to participate with success in a competitive market framework. 
 
Following this short intuition, the production function for the representative firm in the 
informal sector comes: 
 ( )( )2 11 1y DG l kβ μ ηξ− 2⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦A  (A9) 
 ( ) ( )( ) 12 1 1 21 1Y D gY l K Nξβ μ η− −⎡ ⎤= − − η⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦A   (A10) 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 11 1
2 1 2 1 1 1 2
, 1 1 -Y K K D Ag N l K Kβ μ
β β μ η β φ β μ φ β μ ξ ββ μ ξ ηβ ββ β −
− + − − − − + −−
− −− −= −A A  (A11) 
0 1 ,   ,  0 1 ,   ,  0 1 ,  1 ,A Dμ β μ ξ φ ξ η β η−≺ ≺ ; ≺ ≺ ; ≺ ≺ ; ;  
Where D , represents the usual exogenous technological infrastructure, which is smaller than 
the one of the formal sector, A . The elasticities for the capital and labour inputs are different 
and restricted to be smaller than the ones in the formal sector. Labour allocation by the 
representative agent is given by expression ( )11− A . Informal sector firms are still able to 
benefit from public goods and services, but face fiscalization of its use by the authorities, 
which diminishes the factor intensity for public services to be just, β . Parameter μ  can 
therefore be used to determine the impact of fiscalization by authorities. This specification 
could be extended to other productive factors, where one could distinguish between factor 
fiscalization. In this framework, for reasons of simplification, only the dimension described 
above will be considered. 
μ−
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It is straightforward to observe that output in the informal sector will depend on output from 
the formal sector, due to the capacity of using public capital, though restricted by government 
fiscalization. As all productive factor intensities of the informal individual firm technology are 
lower than the ones from firms in the formal sector, investment and labour decisions in this 
economy will only occur if the net factor payments are equal between the two sectors. These 
conditions come as follows: 
 ( ), , 1ik i ii
dy dy
r w
dk d l
= = −
i  (A12) 
 ( ) ( )
1 21 2
1   1 ,
w k
w w r rτ τ− = − =
k k
2
y
 (A13) 
Applying the usual marginal productivity conditions described in (A12) to the equilibrium 
conditions described in (A13), we obtain the labour and capital market equilibrium conditions 
for this economy: 
  (A14) ( ) 11 w yτ φ ξ− =
 ( )( ) 1
1 2
1 1
k
y
k k
τ β η− − = 2y  (A15) 
Solving (A14) for  and then substituting it in (A15), we obtain static relation condition for 
capital between the two sectors: 
1
y
 
( )
( )( )2 1 1 1
1
,   
1 1
w
k
k k
η τ φ
τ β
−= Θ Θ = − − ξ  (A16) 
Substituting (A8) in equation (A4), output of the representative firm and aggregate production 
for the informal sector are obtained as follows: 
 ( ) ( )( )2 1 1 1 11 1y k DG l kβ μ ηηξ− ⎡ ⎤= − − Θ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦A  (A17) 
 ( ) ( )( ) 12 1 1 1 1 11 1Y K Dg l Y K Nβ μ ηη β μ ηξ− −⎡ ⎤= − − Θ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦A  (A18) 
Substituting  in expression (A18) and rearranging the terms, aggregate output for the 
informal sector is now given by the model parameters, formal sector aggregate capital and the 
endogenous variables governed by the model: 
1
Y
  (A19) ( )2 1 1 1Y K D K β η μη + −= ΩΘ
Where parameter Ω is equal to: 
 ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 11 1
1 1
1 1 -Ag N l
β β μ η β φ β μ φ β μ ξ ββ μ ξβ ββ β
− + − − − − + −−
− −− −Ω = −A A  (A20) 
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The following parameter restrictions must now be imposed in order to assure that capital and 
labour are diminishing in the aggregate: 
 ( ) ( )1 ,  1 1β η μ φ β μ ξ β β+ − − + − −≺ ≺
)ξ
 (A21) 
Applying the static market equilibrium conditions necessary for the existence of these two 
sectors in a competitive economy, has produced two technologies that depend only on the 
parameters, exogenous population employed in both sectors and capital employed in the 
formal sector. This style of formalization provides a clear strategy for modelling an economy, 
where decisions, such as capital accumulation and investment, are based solely on the formal 
sector variables. Informal sector capital inputs enter this economy through the static 
equilibrium condition given by (A16). We will consider that formal aggregate capital employed 
in production is always bigger than aggregate informal capital. This restriction is consistent 
with data and research on the informal sector size of developed economies. Recalling the 
market clearing condition for individual firm capital between sectors, (A16), we will just 
impose that , in order to guarantee that this empirical evidence 
is always satisfied. 
( ) ( )(1 1 1w kη τ φ τ β− < − −
 
Following this strategy of modelling will allow us to develop a two sector continuous time 
dynamic model, without having to tackle with the difficulties that arise when dealing with a 
two sector economy maximum problem7. Considering a neoclassical production function for 
the informal sector that depends exclusively on formal capital, will also be consistent with the 
existence of transitional dynamics, since total output for this economy is given separately8. We 
will deal with this subject later on, when deriving an analytical solution for the transitions 
dynamics of this economy, however, this subject can be described intuitively by a simple 
analysis of the aggregate marginal productivity of capital. Taking a partial derivative of  on 
, we obtain: 
1
Y
1
K
( ) (
1 1
1 1'
2, 1
1
K
Y K
Y Y
K
= + )'K K
                                                
, it is clear that this expression still depends on formal sector 
capital, which in turn depends on time.  
 
Considering the usual endogenous growth hypotheses, where capital grows at a constant 
growth rate, we can obtain a simple asymptotic rule guarantying that long run output will 
depend only on formal sector activities: 
7The formalization of the two sector economy optimal control problem is reproduced in the appendix.  
8Barro and Sala-i-Martin(1999) discuss both this strategy and the CES production function formulation, 
in pages 161 to 167 of their book. 
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( )
1
1
1 1'
1
lim
Kk
Y K
Y
K→∞
= , this result is consistent to restrictions imposed on parameters on equation 
(A19), which imply that the marginal productivity of aggregate informal capital will decline 
asymptotically, until it becomes negligible on the long run. 
 
Assuming that capital depreciates at the constant rate equal to δ , the representative firm 
intertemporal capital accumulation constraint is given as usual by: 
  (A22) - , 1,2
i i i
k i k iδ= =
In a small open economy framework, it is standard to assume that individuals and firms have 
full access to international capital markets and can accumulate debt (or foreign bonds) at an 
exogenously given world interest rate. As a result, the intertemporal budget constraint facing 
the representative agent in this economy will be equal to individual consumption, c , plus 
investment, , and debt interest payments, rb , minus capital and labour incomes,  and 
i
i
k
r k
i
( )1iw − l
2
1
k
r k
0
0
, assuming that the representative agent is a net borrower9. To obtain this specific 
constraint according to the assumptions described in previous chapters, we only need to 
consider the additional government revenue implications, as defined in equation (A8). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 21 2 1 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1
c w k k
b c i i rb w l r k w lτ τ τ τ= + + + + + − − − − − − − − − A A  (A23) 
 
3.1. Dynamic general equilibrium conditions for labour allocation and leisure 
 
Substituting the functional form for the representative agent utility in the optimality 
conditions, (A70) and (A71), for consumption and leisure, we obtain the representative agents 
intertemporal conditions for consumption and labour/leisure decisions: 
  (A24) ( )1 1 cc lγ θγ λ τ− + + =
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 11 1wc l w wγ θγθ λ τ− ⎡ ⎤+ − + − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦A A  (A25) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 1 1w w l w lλ τ⎡− − − + − =⎢⎣ 0⎤⎥⎦
                                                
 (A26) 
Applying market clearing and aggregate conditions to expressions (A24) and (A25), 
substituting then the optimal control for aggregate consumption obtained from (A24), in the 
macroeconomic labour/leisure condition obtained from (A25), and rearranging in an intuitive 
form, we obtain the dynamics for labour and leisure in this economy: 
9This type of intertemporal budget constraints leaves the possibility of analyzing agents and economies 
that act as net lenders also. 
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 ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 2 1 2 1
1
1 1 , 1
c
w
Cl
l Y K Y K K
θ τ
τ φ ξ
+=− − + −A A  (A27) 
 ( )
( )
( ) ( )1 1 1
1
lim
1 1
c
t
w
Cl
l Y
θ τ
τ φ→∞
+=− − AK  (A28) 
Following the same strategy for optimal labour allocation, we obtain from (A26), the 
expressions that determine the dynamics of labour allocation during transitions and in the 
long run: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 11 w Y K Y Kτ φ ξ− =  (A29) 
 
( ) ( )(
( ) ( )
)1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1
1 ,
1
w
Y K K
Y K
ξ
τ φ
− −= −
A A
A A
1
1
 (A30) 
This implies that in the long run . ( )1 1lim 1 0 lim 1t t→∞ →∞− = ⇒ =A A
 
This section introduced the issue of informal entrepreneurial activities that are based on the 
existence of microeconomic assumptions, which do not hold on the aggregate framework. 
Recall from equation (A26), the optimality condition for labour allocation, where we obtained 
the same market clearing condition, (A13), that we have proposed initially for labour 
allocation. However equations (A29) and (A30) clearly show that at the macro level, long run 
equilibrium will be defined solely by formal activities and informal activities have their 
existence limited to transitions to the long run outcome. This concept is also observed in the 
behaviour of labour/leisure to equilibrium, where the long run equilibrium expression, (A28), 
follows the optimal condition for this class of utility functions, when  and an optimal 
control problem of endogenous growth with just one state condition is considered. 
1
1=A
 
3.2. Capital market equilibrium assuming no information between sectors 
 
For the moment, we will continue to assume that our optimal control problem is given by the 
three state conditions described in section 1. of the appendix. The first consequence of this 
assumption is obtained from the optimality conditions for investment decisions, (A73) and 
(A74), which state that the shadow prices of foreign and domestic capital must equalize.  
  (A31) 
1 2
q q λ= =−
Substituting this condition in the co-state conditions, (A76) and (A77), for domestic capital 
accumulation, we obtain the micro equilibrium condition for domestic capital accumulation 
that we defined theoretically in (A13). However, as in labour allocation and leisure decisions, 
this condition does not hold, when the dynamic general equilibrium conditions are considered: 
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 ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 2
1 2
,
1 1
k
Y K Y K K
K K
τ β η− − =  (A32) 
Equation (A32) defines a long run equilibrium condition between formal and informal 
aggregate capital, which is not viable asymptotically, when we consider formal aggregate 
capital to grow at a constant rate and informal aggregate capital to decay asymptotically after 
reaching a maximum. In this case, the indifference between accumulating foreign bonds, 
defined in the Keynes-Ramsey consumption equation (A33), or domestic capital, would reduce 
to the simpler case with one formal sector of production, where informal activities would only 
play a role in the aggregate budget equilibrium outcome and no role in consumption decisions. 
 
( )
( )1
r
C
ρ
γ
−= −
 C
                                                
 (A33) 
This assumption is contrary to empirical results on underground activities, which relate the 
majority share of its revenues to short and medium run consumption by their holders. This 
logic is related both to the motivations of agents to participate in these activities and 
government fiscalization limitations. Most of the participants in this type of activities accept 
the risk of being caught, in exchange of the possibility to expand their consumption share. On 
the other hand, fiscalization by authorities reinforce this incentive, due to the obvious 
limitations to control everyday consumption activities, where it is difficult to assert the origin 
of this type of revenues, without imposing excessive limitations on commercial transactions. 
 
3.3. Capital market equilibrium assuming asymmetric information in investment decisions 
 
To tackle the problems discussed in the previous two sections, we propose to define possible 
criterions to obtain an optimal control problem that is consistent with a endogenous growth 
model with long transitions, following the Jones and Manuelli (1990) proposal. This 
hypothesis is consistent to consider that the long run is a sum of short and medium run 
specific periods and that in all of these shorter periods, opportunities for entrepreneurial 
informal activities arise. As a specification consistent to the Jones and Manuelli (1990) 
hypothesis produces periods of long transitions to steady-state endogenous growth, it provides 
an ideal benchmark framework to deal with the issue of informality in a macroeconomic 
context. First, we know that at the micro level opportunities to engage in informal activities 
arise from multiple possibilities in developed economies such as excess bureaucracy, 
unregulated technological innovation 10, barriers to entry and our specific proposal of excess 
10 The Internet history provides a vast set of examples of informal activities that not only took 
advantage of existent technology but also introduced innovations, in order to obtain market shares of 
unregulated activities. In some cases, as the electronic music market, reached the proportions of an 
industrial phenomenon. In the long run, however, the majority of these operations were driven, by 
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taxation. Second, we know that in developed economies the formal sector activities are 
dominant in the long run outcomes of society, which is consistent with the outcome of an 
endogenous growth model driven by formal sector activities, as our proposal suggests. In order 
to obtain this outcome, we just need to define a different level of information available to 
households and firms about the relation between both productive sectors. In this section, we 
assume that agents have information about the linear relation between capital11, (A16), but 
lack information about investment decisions between sectors. 
 
Substituting the relation for capital between sectors, (A16), in the optimization problem 
described in section 1. of the appendix, we can rewrite both the new representative agent co-
state and aggregate conditions for capital accumulation easily: 
  (A34) ( ) ( )(
1 21 2 1
1
k k k
q q rρ δ λ τ= +Θ + − +Θ )1r
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 11 2 1 1
1 1
1 1
k
Y K Y K
q q
K K
ρ δ λ τ β η
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= +Θ + − − + Θ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
 ⎟  (A35) 
Where 
( )( ) ( )
( )( )2 1
1 1 1
1
1 1
k w
k
τ β ξ η τ
τ β ξ
− − + −Θ = +Θ = − −
φ
. 
In this case, we can easily observe that the remaining co-state condition for informal capital 
has no useful information for our optimal control problem. Therefore, we are still considering a 
three state optimization problem, which could be reduced to a two state problem had we 
decided to deal with aggregate capital accumulation instead of specific to sector capital 
accumulation. The results of this option, however, would produce the same analytical outcome 
and would not add additional hypothesis to our strategy. 
 
To obtain the aggregate expression that is crucial to guarantee indifference in accumulation 
between foreign and domestic capital in this economy, we just need to consider the optimal 
investment condition (A73) and substitute it in the co-state conditions (A75) and (A35). Then, 
we can either obtain the two possible Keynes-Ramsey rules of consumption or solve the two 
dimensional endogenous system of co-state variables, to obtain the intertemporal financial 
rule for indifference in capital accumulation: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 11
1 1
1 1
k
Y K Y K
r
K K
τ β η= − − + Θ −Θ
2
δ
                                                                                                                                                              
 (A36) 
 
regulation and fiscalization by authorities, and economies of scale from formal sector firms, to adopt 
legal standards, face closure or reduce their activities to a residual and undetectable dimension. 
11This assumption will imply that from now on we will consider (A17) to be the individual firm informal 
production technology, in substitution of (A9), and informal aggregate output to be defined by (A18) 
instead of (A11). This assumption is necessary in order to consider just one state condition for capital 
accumulation and does not alter the dynamic general equilibrium conditions considered in section 3.1.. 
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 ( )( ) ( )1 1 2
1
lim 1 1
kt
Y K
r
K
τ β
→∞
= − − −Θ δ  (A37) 
We take the option of not dealing with this hypothesis further and leave just this short 
introduction to the issue of limited information. This decision is based on the fact that the 
asymmetric information about investment decisions case is less tractable analytically, than 
the full information hypothesis of the subsequent sections. In spite of that, the strategy to 
solve analytically both for the long run and transitional dynamics, will follow closely that from 
the complete information case, although, much less intuitive. One of the main interests of this 
hypothesis is discussed in Mendonça (2007), where it is shown that the existence of a set of 
endogenous rules for the existence of an optimal fiscal policy 12, as described in Turnovsky 
(1999), is no longer available and public choice outcomes must arise, when a full information 
central planner is considered. 
 
3.4. Capital market equilibrium assuming complete information about investment decisions 
 
It is straightforward to obtain a linear relation for investment decisions between sectors using 
the linear relation for capital, already defined in (A16), and both the capital accumulation 
differential equations, defined by (A22). Extending the informal sector accumulation condition 
as a function of formal capital, following (A16), we obtain the following linear endogenous 
solution for investment decisions. 
 
( )
( )( )2
1
1 1
w
k
i
η τ φ
τ β ξ
−= − − 1i
                                                
 (A38) 
This simplifying assumption is necessary to fully internalize the information about informal 
activities, as a function of formal sector variables, and is consistent with the existence of a 
balanced growth path governing capital accumulation and no non-linear assumptions about 
investment decisions. Discarding capital accumulation in the informal sector and substituting 
the linear relation for investment in the households intertemporal open economy budget 
β
12In our multiple fiscal policy framework with just a formal productive sector, optimal fiscal policy is 
defined by a set of endogenous linked fiscal rules that can be defined to be consistent to the neoclassical 
assumptions on growth maximization, no taxes on productive factors and a government size consistent 
with its input elasticity ( ), guarantee that the Ramsey (1927) optimal taxation 
principle is achievable and endogenously given. In our specific choice of households utility, the rule that 
guarantees a fiscal policy that minimizes the decrement of utility, in order to minimize the economic 
distortion of taxation (excess burden), not taking into account the equity and redistributive aspects that 
may arise from fiscal policy, is given by 
0
k
gτ = ⇒ =
 
w c
τ τ− = . This rule defines a framework where taxes on 
leisure are obtained by subsidizing labour, so that both consumption and leisure, the two utility 
enhancing activities, are taxed uniformly resulting in a dynamic application of the Ramsey optimal 
taxation principle. This short description resumes the findings of Turnovsky (1999) for this class of 
fiscal policy endogenous growth models and builds on its main assumptions. 
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constraint, our optimal control problem is reduced to a two state optimal control problem with 
just one optimal control condition for investment decisions.  
  (A39) 
1
q λ=− Θ
2
1
r ( ) ( )
1 21 1
1
k k k
q q rρ δ λ τ⎡ ⎤= + + − +Θ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (A40) 
Applying market clearing and aggregate conditions, we obtain the dynamic general 
equilibrium co-state condition for formal capital: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 11 1 1
1 1
1 1
k
Y K Y K
q q
K K
ρ δ λ τ β η
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= + + − − + Θ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (A41) 
Substituting the optimal control expression for investment, (A39), in (A41), and then following 
the same strategy for obtaining the two possible optimal Keynes-Ramsey consumption rules, 
we obtain the transitions and long run endogenous expressions for financial equilibrium in 
this economy: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 112
1 1
1 1
k
Y K Y K
r
K K
τ β η−
⎡ ⎤⎢= Θ − − + Θ −⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
1
δ⎥⎥  (A42) 
 ( )( ) ( )1 112
1
lim 1 1
kt
Y K
r
K
τ β−
→∞
= Θ − − − δ  (A43) 
 
3.5. Long run equilibrium dynamics for the full information economy 
 
Assuming no further hypotheses about non-convexities, the dynamic long run outcome for the 
complete information economy can be obtained, through solving the simple usual dynamic 
case of endogenous growth in a small open economy. Substituting the steady state condition, 
defined by (A42), in the differential equation for consumption, (A33), we obtain the 
intertemporal Keynes-Ramey consumption rule:  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 112 1
1 1
1 1
1
k
Y K Y K
K K
C C
ρ δ τ β η
γ
−
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎟⎜ ⎢ ⎥ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ −Θ − − + Θ⎜ ⎢ ⎥ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎢ ⎥ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟= ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
  (A44) 
The intertemporal aggregate budget constraint for the decentralized full information economy 
comes: 
  (A45) 
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 1
1
1 1 1 1
c
k w
B C I rB T
Y K Y K
τ
τ β φ τ ξ η
= + + Θ + + −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡− − − + − − − + Θ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎦ ⎣

A A ⎤⎥⎦
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Substituting again the exogenous international interest rate, by the steady state rule of 
indifference in accumulation, (A42), investment by the capital accumulation equation and 
rearranging in the usual form, the net wealth differential equation for this economy comes: 
  (A46) 
2 1 2 1
W K B W K= Θ − ⇒ = Θ −  B
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( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 11
2 1
1
2 1 1
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1
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K
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K
τ β φ τ ω δ
η ξ ω τ
−
−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= Θ − − + − Θ −Θ +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+ Θ + − Θ Θ − + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 A
A
2 2
T
 (A47) 
Where  
1dom
K Wω = . 
 
We have considered the parameter  related to aggregate labour incomes, in order to 
simplify our system. This parameter has no transitions in the long run, when the growth rates 
of net wealth and formal capital equalize. We will use it to define the long run endogenous 
equilibrium and discuss the issue of transitions in the following sections. 
dom
ω
 
We can now describe the long run endogenous equilibrium for this economy by applying the 
standard asymptotic assumptions, about labour allocation, production and leisure, to the 
system defined by (A44) and (A47). The long run dynamical system is given by:  
 
( )( ) ( )1 112
1
/
1 1
1
k
l r l r
Y K
K
C
ρ δ τ β
γ
−
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ + −Θ − − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠

/
C  (A48) 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1/ 2 /
1
1 1 1 1
l r k w dom l r c l r
Y K
W W
K
τ β φ τ ω δ τ−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= Θ − − + − − − +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦

/
C T−  (A49) 
Solving for a common growth rate and assuming that lump-sum taxation decays 
asymptotically to zero in the long run, the endogenous equilibrium expressions are given by: 
 
( )( ) ( )1 112
1
/
1 1
1
k
l r
Y K
K
ρ δ τ β
γ
−+ −Θ − −
Ψ = −  (A50) 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
1 1 1
2
/ 1
/
1 1 1 1
1 1
k w dom
l r
l r c
Y K
c K
w
τ β γ φ τ ω γ δγ
γ τ
−⎡ ⎤Θ − − + − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= − +


ρ
xtΨ
 (A51) 
Where we took trends using the following scaling rule, . x xt t
t t t t x t
X x e X x e x eΨ Ψ= ⇒ = + Ψ  
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Linearising the system around equilibrium, we can now describe the long run dynamics of this 
economy using the varational system: 
dc dc
c c c
w


dc dw
w wdw dw
dc dw
Ψ Ψ
Ψ Ψ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
 
    

, and 
dc dc
dc dw
J
dw dw
dc dw
Ψ Ψ
Ψ Ψ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
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
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the roots of the characteristic equation are given by  and . 
1
( )tr Jλ =
2
0λ =
 
Final restrictions for long run endogenous equilibrium in this economy come: 
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The last condition for the consumption and net wealth ratio implies that this is an endogenous 
system that adjusts discontinuously, following the standard dynamics of linearized systems, 
where the Jacobian has a null determinant and a positive trace. However, this is only possible 
when we consider the asymptotic properties of this economy. To tackle the transitions for this 
system we need to adopt a new strategy for scaling, which is consistent with both the 
described asymptotic properties and long run equilibrium dynamics. 
 
3.6. Transitional dynamics 
 
The original proposal from Mendonça (2007) for scaling the transitions model with an informal 
sector, was based on the definition of a control variable and a state variable for the centralized 
closed economy problem, originally suggested in Jones and Manuelli (1990). This original 
transformation, implied considering the average product of aggregate capital, as a state like 
variable, and the consumption to capital ratio as a control like variable. However, in an open 
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economy framework, an additional dimension arises, when we consider the intertemporal 
budget constraint. This additional state variable defines the international financial situation 
and introduces further transitional dynamics that can only be tackled analytically in the 
Jones and Manuelli (1990) fashion, if we assume some simplifying assumptions. To obtain the 
overall transitions of this system, we originally proposed to define the control like variable, as 
the consumption to net wealth ratio and the state like variable, as the average product of 
formal capital. In this section, we will extend our original proposal for the control like variable 
dynamics and assume the original proposal for a state like variable based on aggregate 
capital. The base transformations and respective differential equations are presented in 
equations (A52) and (A53): 
 
1 1
C C
Z Z Z
W W
= ⇒ = − 
1
W
W
 (A52) 
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  (A53) 
The differential equation for the state like variable  and the steady-state equilibrium 
expression  are given by: 
2
Z
2
Z
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 12 2 2 2 2
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K K K
β η μ −
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Recall that the growth rate expression and its transitions can be obtained as a function of : 
2
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 (A55) 
Solving for equilibrium, we obtain the long run growth rate as a function of   dynamic 
equilibrium defined in (A54): 
2
Z
 ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
1 11
2
1
2 2
1 1
1
k
l r
Y K
K
Z Z
ρ δ τ β
γ
−+ −Θ − −
Ψ = ⇔ Ψ = Ψ− /  (A56) 
As we have not defined any source of transitions for the growth rate of formal capital, we 
assume from now on that it grows at a constant rate given by: 
 ( )
1 2K
ZΨ = Ψ = Ψ
/l r
 (A57) 
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This simplifying assumption is consistent with the linear assumptions about both investment 
decisions and capital accumulation that we have discussed in the previous sections. 
 
Turning our attention to the control like variable defined in (A52), it is straightforward to 
obtain an identity that transforms this control variable into the dynamics of two specific 
control variables, which will able us to tackle the existent transitions for domestic capital and 
net wealth, already discussed in the previous section. 
 2 1
1 1 3 4
2 1 2 1
2 1
,  , 
C
KC C
Z Z Z Z
W W K
K
Θ= ⇔ = = =Θ Θ
Θ
W
K
 (A58) 
Departing from (A52), assuming the term related to lump sum taxation is equal to zero, the 
differential equation for the control like variable comes: 
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(A59) 
In equilibrium, excluding the obvious corner solution, we obtain the same expression as in the 
long run solution for the scaled capital to net wealth ratio, (A51): 
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From (A59) and (A60), it becomes clear that both the dynamics and equilibrium for the control 
like variable  are still dependent from additional transitions that are imposed by . We 
need to define these additional transitions in order to obtain the overall dynamics of this 
system. 
1
Z
4
Z
 
We start by obtaining the differential equation for : 
3
Z
 ( ) ( )13 3 3 2
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Z Z Z Z Z
K K 2 3
Z⎡ ⎤= − ⇔ = Ψ −Ψ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦Θ
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The dynamics for  are given by the transitions of , as it is shown in (A61), therefore this 
variable is assumed to be given recursively and independently by  dynamics. A quick 
3
Z
2
Z
2
Z
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inspection to the dynamical system defined by (A54) and (A61), reveals that the equilibrium 
for the state like variable is a unique equilibrium for this system. Linearising this system in 
the neighbourhood of equilibrium, we obtain the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, which are 
both real, with one equal to zero and the other equal to the trace, which is negative. By 
definition this is consistent with a stable degenerate focus that adjusts continuously. In our 
specific case, it confirms the recursive behaviour of , where the initial values, transitions 
and equilibrium are dependent only on the dynamics of  and the specific choice of 
parameters. 
3
Z
2
Z
 
Finally, the dynamics for , excluding the lump-sum taxation term, are given by: 
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In equilibrium we obtain: 
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Defining a two dimensional simplified dynamical system to describe analytically the overall 
transitions of this economy in a clear and straightforward manner is a risky endeavour, 
following the extensions we have proposed in this section. Although, it is possible to define an 
independent system for ,  and , such a solution might not capture all the dynamics 
involved during transitions 
1
Z
2
Z
4
Z
13, when we consider the remaining modular dynamics from the 
system of endogenous variables, composed by labour/leisure choices, government dimension 
and labour allocation decisions. However, there are some interesting features that we can add 
to this framework. First, we showed how it is possible to describe the control and state 
variable dynamic system by reducing its dimension from four to three meaningful differential 
equations. This approach can be performed also by using the transitions for , instead of the 
3
Z
13In section 2. of the appendix, we define the dynamics for this three dimensional system to be saddle 
path dependent, when imposing a simple block reduction on the original Jacobian matrix, evaluated in 
equilibrium. However, this analysis is invalid when we assume the possible self-exciting effect of the 
modular endogenous system for labour allocation, leisure and government spending. It is doubtful that 
the Grobman-Hartman linearization theorem holds under these conditions. 
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transitions for , if we consider the following equality already described in (A58). Redefining
, we can rewrite equation (A59) as: 
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Equilibrium for this expression will now be given by the following equation, which must be 
equivalent to (A60): 
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One benefit from undertaking this option is that now we have a steady-state condition for the 
consumption to net wealth ratio that depends exclusively on the parameters, while in (A60) we 
still have to take into account the equilibrium expression for , which still depends on . 
The second interesting feature about this approach is that now, we are sure the reduced two 
dimensional original simplified system, depends only on transitions from one of the additional 
transformed variables. When we relax this specific transition mechanics for both simplified 
systems, composed by (A54) and (A59), or (A54) and (A65), we found that in both 
characteristic equations the roots are of opposite sign, following the rule for a negative 
Jacobian determinant. This clearly indicates that steady-state convergence dynamic 
associated with the transformed system should follow a unique saddle path. This possibility is 
reinforced when only the recursive transitions for  are considered. However, we know that 
both differential equations for  are non-linear, and in the case of (A65) the transformation 
proposed adds further non-linearities to the original proposal. Therefore, we follow a cautious 
path in the presence the specific complexities we enumerated and opt to present a set of 
proposals for numerical simulations on convergence and comparative dynamics. 
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We finish this section by defining the transformed algebraic system of endogenous variables: 
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Again, we relax the lump sum taxation term in (A69), following all of our previous options on 
this issue. 
 
3.7. Numerical convergence analysis 
 
In the final two sections of this paper we assess the dynamic behaviour of the three 
dimensions transitions system, described by equations (A54), (A59) and (A63), using 
numerical simulation methods, with the aim of evaluating both policy and convergence 
outcomes. In section 2. of the appendix, we discussed the specific dynamics obtained by 
evaluating the Jacobian for the linearized autonomous system, as being saddle path 
consistent. However, we also put forward the hypothesis that both long convergence paths and 
feedback from the endogenous system, (A67) to (A69), would likely introduce more complex 
dynamics. The problem was then, how to tackle this simulation in a way that would capture 
the overall dynamics described in section 3.6.? As the dynamics of the differential autonomous 
system are most probably saddle path dependent, we decided to follow the Mendonça (2007) 
proposal to tackle this problem as a boundary value problem. This decision has some 
downfalls, but it provides a simple framework to avoid both backward error tolerant 
integration methods and grid search techniques, for finding consistent initial values. Then we 
would use a loop to evaluate the endogenous outcomes at a given step size and the respective 
dynamic innovations on the autonomous system, in order to evaluate the new path to the 
initially computed steady-state. Endogenous transitions would then impact the differential 
system, which in turn would produce a feed back that restarted the process. This 
straightforward loop structure looked promising in theory, but faced several problems when 
subject to experimentation. Problems arose on both endogenous steady-state estimation and 
differential equations collocation. As we were using the MATLAB software, specifically the old 
routine for numerical steady-state estimation of non-linear systems, fsolve, and the bvp4c 
routine, used on simulation of boundary value problems, with the purpose of tackling the 
proposed loop algorithm, we decided to maintain the basic framework from Mendonça (2007), 
of relaxing endogenous transitions and its dynamical outcomes, while extending this method 
just a little further and leaving the proposal for a new simulation procedure to another 
opportunity. In the end of this section, we discuss further options to tackle the full dynamics of 
this system numerically. 
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With the purpose of exposing the long transitions that we have discussed in the previous 
sections, we decided to simulate the differential autonomous system, using the standard 
shooting method, by assuming a boundary defined by the combined computation of the overall 
equilibrium system. The endogenous variables would then be relaxed to the numerical 
parameters obtained from the steady-state computed values. Again, problems occurred when 
using the fsolve routine with this system. This was not a surprise due to the nonlinearities 
present in the endogenous system. We tackled this problem by assuming labour allocation to 
follow the analytical and theoretical long run outcome, where all labour is considered to be 
allocated on formal activities. This set of assumptions provides a simplified approach to 
portray the long transitions and equilibrium outcomes, but embodies an excessive 
simplification, which holds no useful information on the outcomes of informality. We discuss 
some of these outcomes for policy in the next section, by assuming there is always labour 
allocation in the informal sector, and leave the rest of this section to discuss the outcomes of 
our proposal for numerical convergence analysis14. 
 
Choosing a set of numerical parameters, described in table 2, which are consistent with the 
restrictions imposed by the model, we obtain, in table 3 and in figures 1 to 5, the steady-state 
values and convergence dynamics for the transformed differential system, respectively. 
 
Parameter ρ  γ  cτ  1A  φ  wτ  β  η  
Value 0,02 0,3 0,2 1 0,5 0,2 0,25 0,15 
Parameter A  μ  N  ξ  δ  kτ  θ  1Θ  
Value 0,11 0,1 400 0,3 0,05 0,2 0,5 0.33 
Table 2- Base parameters for convergence evaluation. 
 
*Z
1 2 3 4
 *Z  *Z  *Z  *Ψ /l r *l g  *  ( )
*
1 1
1
Y K
K
 
0,0368 0,1426 0,068 1,846 0,0222 0,4172 0,3554 0,1901 
Table 3- Computed steady-state15. 
 
                                                
14All MATLAB routines used in both this and the next section simulations can be downloaded here. 
15The numerical results obtained are sensible to the choice of initial values. Specifically, the initial 
choice for , holds very different steady-state outcomes, which in turn changes the remaining steady-
state values also. This is an important issue, as the  variable determines the overall relative assets 
of the economy and a greater equilibrium value corresponds to a bigger incentive to substitute labour 
for leisure. Our choice of initial value for this variable was equal to 1.05 in this simulation. These 
outcomes are a result of non-linearities and possible different root solutions, which end up determining 
very different results for very similar choices of initial values.  
4
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Fig. 1-  convergence transitions path. 
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Fig. 3-  convergence transitions path. 
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Fig. 2- Z  convergence transitions path. 
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Fig. 4-  convergence transitions path. 
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Fig. 5- Growth rate transitions during convergence. 
 
Still, we were not able to capture the full complex dynamics of our scaled system of 
transitions. We have already discussed, how we were not able to implement our proposal 
based on the estimation of a boundary value problem assuming endogenous outcomes. Yet, 
there is still scope to define a new strategy that is able to tackle the overall system of 
transitions. Originally, this system was designed to be evaluated as a differential algebraic 
system. However, it is not possible to obtain the required simplified expressions for the 
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endogenous system, without imposing several restrictions that would undermine some of the 
system dynamical features or, at least, violate some of the theoretical parameter restrictions. 
Numerical simulations strategies that build on the original idea described in this section must 
follow initial value methods for differential equation systems, with algebraic features. In 
recent economic growth theory this methods might range from simple backward integration, 
as proposed by Bruner and Strulik (2002), or relaxation procedures as the one proposed by 
Trimborn, Koch and Steger (2006). At least, such methods could be used to tackle the problem 
of stiff transitions arising, when boundary problem simulators are used. On the other hand, 
further scaling and simplification of the endogenous system might be necessary, in order to 
capture the full dynamics of this system with such methods. A critical hypothesis in this type 
of scenario would be to appeal to discretization methods and transform the overall system, in a 
system of partial or delay differential equations. This is always an attractive hypothesis in 
these problematic dynamic simulation scenarios, however, such choice would always produce 
outcomes that are linked with initial discretization assumptions. This option should therefore 
be considered as a last resort. 
 
3.8. Comparative dynamics for fiscal policy 
 
We end this numerical overview of the autonomous transitions system by evaluating the fiscal 
policy outcomes for this economy. First, we start by evaluating comparative long run outcomes 
of taxation policy. For this purpose, we now assume that labour allocation in the informal 
sector is fixed at 15%, with the aim of evaluating the long run steady-state outcomes that 
result from simple tax adjustments on the proposed scenario. Table 4 displays the long run 
outcomes for the transformed variables, when a single specific tax cut equal to 1% is 
considered: 
 
 *ZΔ 1 2 3 *ZΔ  *ZΔ  *ZΔ 4  *ΔΨ /l r  *lΔ  *Δg  ( )
*
1 1
1
Y K
K
Δ  
0
k
τΔ <  >0 <0 <0 <0 >0 <0 <0 <0 
0
c
τΔ <  >0 <0 >0 >0 <0 <0 <0 <0 
0
w
τΔ <  >0 <0 >0 <0 <0 >0 <0 <0 
Table 4- Fiscal policy long run outcomes. 
 
These results come in line with our expectations, as only the capital taxes, which are directly 
related to our growth engine, produce growth enhancing outcomes. The remaining policies all 
render a long run growth diminishing effect, by either enhancing leisure, in the case of labour 
tax cuts, or diminishing investment in public services and infrastructure, by imposing 
restrictions on the government balanced budget constraint. Overall results show a negligible 
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effect on long run outcomes from fiscal policy, except for the limited effect of the capital 
taxation policy. Moreover, all policies have negative effects on the overall marginal 
productivity of this economy, although, in the cases of capital and consumption taxation, this 
is due to the balanced budget effect exclusively. Other interesting feature of this simple policy 
evaluation, is the worsening of the long run financial macroeconomic position, portrayed by 
the consumption to net wealth ratio variable . Although, the causes vary among each 
specific policy, this is a clear indication that simple tax cut policies tend to enhance 
consumption incentives, at the expense of long run wealth accumulation in this economy. This 
outcome may only be overall Pareto efficient in the capital tax case, where there is an observed 
increase in the long run growth rate. Still, we cannot evaluate the full effect of the informal 
sector because, for the reasons already stated, we have to maintain labour allocation fixed. We 
know that informal activities take some part on the reduced impact of overall individual tax 
policy and on the direction of the specific outcomes, from our analytical framework. However, 
as we cannot observe the shifts in labour allocation between formal and informal activities, 
the full outcomes of policy are only a specific result related to the base parameter chosen for 
labour allocation. To tackle this problem, we propose to perform a grid search on possible 
outcomes, to evaluate the unique long run labour allocation outcome that minimizes a 
measure of steady-state variance, for each specific policy. To choose this threshold value for 
labour allocation, we grid search a set of possible values for labour allocation and choose the 
one that minimizes the overall absolute mean square deviation between steady-state 
outcomes. The threshold values for formal labour allocation for single tax cuts equal to 5%, on 
capital, consumption and labour are, respectively, 0,84, 0,84 and 0,83. These values determine 
the long run outcomes for formal labour allocation that reduce the impact of policy decisions. 
It also minimizes the probability of a policy performing positively or negatively, due to the 
existence of the substitution effect between formal and informal activities, arising from 
government taxation of formal activities. Of course, we know that an increase on labour 
allocation in the formal sector improves the long run outcome of this economy, so the results 
obtained suggest that even if the overall outcome of fiscal policy does not incentive formal 
labour allocation, there is still room for minimizing risks, when opting on simple tax reforms, 
rather than more complex ones, as we will show next. 
1
Z
 
We tackle this issue in this next experimentation, by assuming a complex fiscal reform policy, 
instead of the simple tax reforms discussed. We know there is still scope to produce long run 
Pareto efficient outcomes, when opting for a more complex reform, but the policy risks should 
be increased by the existence of informal activities opportunities that take advantage of the 
direct and indirect costs of taxation. Table 3 summarizes the long run outcomes of a fiscal 
reform that reduces taxes on capital to 15% and tries to minimize the reduction of the long run 
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government budget outcome, by increasing taxes on consumption to 22% and taxes on labour 
to 23%: 
 
 
*Z
1 2 3 4
 *Z  *Z  *Z  *Ψ /l r *l g  *  ( )
*
1 1
1
Y K
K
 
k
τ = 0,2, =0,2, = 0,2 
c
τ
w
τ 0,0348 0,117 0,0634 1,8209 0,0003 0,4887 0,3433 0,1560 
k
τ = 0,15, =0,22, = 0,23 
c
τ
w
τ 0,0329 0,1192 0,0565 1,7194 0,0086 0,4678 0,315 0,1557 
Table 5- Computed steady-states outcomes for fiscal reform policy. 
 
As we expected, our radical policy proposal geared towards spurring growth, managed to 
improve, both the overall financial position of the economy in the long run, and sustain a 
government budget share above 30% of total output. Nonetheless, the incentives to increase 
the labour supply did not manage to overcome the overall negative effect of government 
spending reduction on marginal productivity. Overall, the fiscal reform has proved to be a 
Pareto improvement comparatively to the base scenario. The threshold for formal labour 
allocation to minimize policy outcomes is estimated to be equal to 0,85, which is exactly equal 
to the base parameter chosen for this experiment. This result comes in line with our 
expectations of the higher risks involved in choosing more complex policies, but also confirms 
that there is still scope for improvements, based on the limited results obtained from fiscal 
policy reform in this environment. 
 
We finish this section by reproducing the simulation of the dynamic paths for the autonomous 
system variables, using again the shooting method from our previous section. However, we are 
now able to decrease the convergence problems, we discussed in the previous section, by 
assuming that  always adjusts continuously, which is in accordance to the linearization 
analysis performed on section 2. of the appendix. We discard continuous adjustment for the 
remaining variable with a dynamic transition associated to a real negative eigenvector, , 
because overall transitions will be extremely long, before converging to the computed long run 
steady-state outcome. This set of assumptions allows for smother dynamic transitions to long 
run outcomes, however, it enhances the long, and still rigid, convergence dynamics that we 
discussed in previous sections. This last result concludes the set of hypothesis we have 
introduced in this paper, with the purpose of discussing the implications of fiscal policy on a 
growth environment facing an informal productive sector, by showing how government fiscal 
policy is not only undermined and increasingly risky, due to the existence of an informal 
sector, but the outcomes of that policy are subject to very long transitions, due to the 
persistence imposed by informal activities. This result leaves also the possibility that fiscal 
2
Z
4
Z
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reform may be undermined by other exogenous shocks or different policy reforms, since a very 
long time frame of adjustment will surely subject these transition dynamics to other relevant 
innovations. 
 
In figures 6 to 10 we reproduce the dynamic transitions for the fiscal reform proposal we 
discussed: 
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Fig. 10- Growth rate dynamic transitions. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Main stream culture has always somewhat glamorized informal activities in industrialized 
economies, by producing both art products, such as movies, television series, fictional literature, 
music lyrics, and promoting life style philosophies that portray informal activities, as an 
opportunity to pursue on the edge careers, as opposed to the limited opportunities for 
adventure, arising from being the average individual with a routine occupation. This cultural 
outcome is both a reflex of recent history and a part of the existent problem of increasing 
informal activities in developed economies, which has been identified by various social sciences 
researchers. However, culture is ultimately a product of society and both politics and science 
may claim an important share on this outcome. Politics, undermined informality issues by 
extending public control of the economy, based on both ideological and scientific paradigms and 
promoting an “under the carpet” policy to avoid dealing with all existent dimensions of this 
phenomenon. This led to increasing government spending and bureaucracy on the post-war 
period, which was not waged against emerging social practices that build up directly on 
excessive government intervention, or took advantage of limited fiscalization. The economic 
science, contributed enormously to this scenario of policies, while scientifically defining these 
issues as just sub-subjects of research, restricted to the field of development economics, with 
only some few exceptions defying this scenario. On the other hand, we have consider that the 
expansion of public investment, spending and regulation in developed societies, was both based 
on clear democratic choices by the public and various important scientific proposals, which 
contributed to an overall improvement of the quality of life during recent decades. This outcome 
has been in overall, very positive to industrialized economies, and recent academic research, 
public policy decisions and social awareness manifestations have already taken into account 
that the informal phenomena is also relevant for policy in developed economies. This change in 
tide has hit strongly the foundations of public policy and we no longer discuss only public 
investment, but are worried mainly with its efficiency. Institutions are no longer created, but 
designed to improve the fulfilment of policy and society objectives. Public bureaucracies are 
being substituted by modern efficient public services and regulated private activities. There is 
now a much more clear opinion that underground activities take advantage of public and 
private institutions, market holes and technological innovations, to develop various harmful 
activities that hinder economic and social outcomes. The stirring stories about the local 
business tycoon that started up by managing some sort of informal activity and later prospered 
to be a successful entrepreneur, are being scaled to their dimension, relatively to the business 
volume that is governed by shadow activities, which in its majority is based on the exploration 
of individuals and resources, with no legal, ethical and socio-economic tolerable criteria. This 
research proposal comes in line with these views and tries to tackle both causes and 
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consequences of informality, in a long run growth open developed economy context. Although, 
we have expressed a clear critique to past policy and economics paradigms about informality, 
we also take note that with limited resources and information, both policy and science must 
adjust their priorities according to the available instruments, following contemporary goals 
that respond to society aspirations and concerns. So our proposal is not to ask, where did we 
fail in the past, but what can we do to improve the situation in the future? 
 
We finish up by pointing out what was left to say about our proposal and where we believe it 
can be improved in the future. First, there is a wide scope of options for improvement of 
multiple fiscal policy models, both by introducing other engines of growth, such as human 
capital, ideas and innovation, product variety and technological change, and other sources of 
public spending, such as administrative costs and other productive and non-productive 
spending policies. Our choice for a growth engine was useful to simplify an economy with 
homogeneous households and firms, but it is still a limited approach to the sources of 
increasing returns, even if we reviewed what we considered to be physical capital, as overall 
measure of available capital. Unfortunately, our tangible measure has obvious limitations and 
cannot cope with all the different dimensions that promote growth in modern economies. 
Returning to our specific proposal, one could build on firm heterogeneity hypotheses to 
introduce sources for legal and market barriers to entry, and labour and capital income 
inequalities between agents. These economic dynamics, along with technological innovation 
and society complex evolution, are also important sources of informality, because they also 
promote profiteering opportunities based on shadow activities, since there are important 
limitations to government fiscalization. In our proposal, we suggest an optimal control 
framework for tackling the causes and consequences of informality in a long run growth 
context. As in all original two sector growth model proposals, we ended up with more questions 
to answer, than those we answered. We were still able to engender a full analytical proposal, 
based on the full information assumption about informal investment activities at the micro 
level. When this assumption is dismissed, we showed that a completely different outcome 
emerges. These modelling implications growth exponentially when we consider other simple 
additional features, such as investment adjustment costs and different information criteria for 
investment decisions. So there is still a large range of opportunities to improve our basic 
framework and tackle it analytically. On the issue of numerical simulations, we believe to have 
exhausted the possibilities of tackling this dynamic system as a boundary value problem. We 
discussed thoroughly the range of problems arising from our option and described a set of 
proposals to renew the limited simulation experiments we developed. Therefore, contributions 
to promote a better understanding of extended dynamical problems such as ours, are welcomed, 
and should be recognized as a crucial field for future economics research. 
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Appendix 
  
1. The two sector economy optimal control problem 
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The present value Hamiltonian for this optimization problem is: 
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The Pontryagin maximum conditions for this optimal control problem are: 
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2. Linearised dynamics for the three dimensions system of transitions 
 
The purpose of this section, is to provide a full description of the saddle path dynamics for the 
three dimensional dynamical system composed by the transitions variables ,  and , and 
given by equations (A59), (A54) and (A65), respectively. Substituting the term  in 
equation (A65), the Jacobian matrix of this autonomous system evaluated in equilibrium
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A quick inspection to the Jacobian renders that its determinant depends only on the diagonal 
terms of the matrix and is positive. The characteristic equation for this Jacobian is given by the 
following equality, where λ  represents the eigenvalues associated with each specific root: 
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From the three possible solutions of the characteristic equation above, it is straightforward to 
obtain the eigenvalue associated with the dynamics of , which is given by . We shall 
define this specific root as . This root is real and negative, confirming the independent and 
convergent behaviour of the differential equation given by (A54). The remaining roots 
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16 We extend the definition of equilibrium to the steady state outcome of the endogenous system defined 
by (A67), (A68) and (A69). This simplification is needed to make sure the three dimensional system is 
autonomous from the endogenous mechanics. Specifically, we consider that , which helps 
simplifying the  and terms. This assumption has no effect on the determinant and trace of the 
Jacobian and consequently does not influence the characteristic equation and subsequent conclusions. 
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associated with the dynamics of (A59) and (A65) are given by the following quadratic form 
solution: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 21 11 1 2 1 4 1 2 1 41 2 1 4
1,3
1 1 6 11 1
2 2
c w wc w
Z Z Z Z Z ZZ Z Z τ φ τ φ ττ φ τλ
− −− + + − + − ++ − −= ±
A AA 1 cτ
 
From this solution we can draw the conclusion that both remaining roots of the characteristic 
equation are real, as the square root expression is always positive, given the parameter 
restrictions imposed. However, the expression obtained is still too cumbersome to permit a full 
description of the dynamics associated with these eigenvalues. Nevertheless, we can build from 
the assumptions of independence on  dynamics and reduce the block structure of the three 
dimensional Jacobian, in order to define the signs of the remaining roots. Our reduced form 
Jacobian is then given by the corner terms of the original Jacobian and is equivalent to the two 
dimensions Jacobian of the dynamical system defined by  and . The determinant and 
characteristic equation for this reduced form Jacobian are given by the following expressions: 
2
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( ) ( )12 1 4 12 1 1w cZ Z Zφ τ τ−− − +A 0<  
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 11 2 1 4 1 2 1 41 1 1 1c w wZ Z Z Z Z Zτ λ φ τ λ φ τ τ− −+ − − − − − − + =A A 0c  
From this two expressions associated with the reduced form Jacobian, we are able to determine 
that the two remaining eigenvalues of the original system have opposite signs, as the 
characteristic equation for this system has an equivalent solution given by the  expression 
and the negative determinant is associated with saddle path dynamics, with eigenvalues of 
opposite signs. 
1,3
λ
 
We can extend this dynamic assessment to the remaining two dimensions block structures of 
the original Jacobian that define the specific linearized dynamics for the ,  and ,  
systems. For the first case, we have already observed, in the main text, that we are in the 
presence of saddle path dynamics, which is confirmed by the negative sign of the determinant 
from our reduced form Jacobian. In the second case, the reduced Jacobian has a negative trace 
and a positive determinant, with two negative real eigenvalues. Therefore, we are in the 
presence of a stable focus, with a convergent dynamic behaviour towards equilibrium. Given 
this analysis, we can justifiably assume that the dynamics of the global autonomous system 
follows a saddle path dynamic behaviour, on the three dimensional phase plane. Nevertheless, 
complex transitions might occur as a result of the feedback outcomes from the endogenous 
system, and also from the long transitions to equilibrium, originating from our modelling 
assumptions. Both these features may alter the signs and structure of the partial derivatives of 
1
Z
2
Z
2
Z
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the autonomous system Jacobian during transitions. Therefore, the use of linearization 
analysis on the varational system, following the Grobman-Hartman theorem, might be 
undermined by these features, which may invalidate this global dynamic analysis totally or, at 
least, when we depart from the close neighbourhood of equilibrium. On the other hand, this 
approach serves the purpose of shedding some light on the overall dynamics of this system and 
build up information and criteria for tackling the issues of long run transitions and endogenous 
feedbacks, with the use of numerical simulation procedures. 
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